Quite by accident I participated in the response visit to Moscow of Leonid Kravchuk, the then Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in November, 1991. At that time Moscow saw numerous meetings both at the initiative of M.Gorbachev’s and B.Yeltsin’s teams. Both of them accumulated forces against each other and sought support in the republics. We were preparing for the referendum on the independence of Ukraine. The Russians had already begun to treat us with suspicion, and not only us. However, they tried not to demonstrate it. On the contrary, unlike "gorbachevists", "yeltsinists" strongly emphasized in general terms their support to the expectations of the republics. Though, as soon as it was coming to specifics, they were hiding in a shell like snails. In any case, we could always feel that internal restraint of Russians backing B.Yeltsin. But despite that, we went to the meetings initiated by"yeltsynists" more willingly than to those organized by "unionists."
That time it was the same. It was expected that the meeting would be held under the chairmanship of S.Shakhray. I personally sympathized with him, certainly, not because he had Ukrainian roots. That politician was seen then from Kyiv as a new star in the Moscow sky. Against the background of many Russian democrats, who tried to win popularity with the help of their vocal chords, S.Shakhray had a good logic of a lawyer and calmly explained his position. His views on the restructuring of the socialist society largely coincided with mine. Some of the Ukrainian experts watched him with respect and hoped that such people as he and A.Sobchak, would bring elements of true rule of law to the Soviet reality. However, having met A.Sobchak at the funeral of a wonderful person, a former Chief Arbitrator of Ukraine and the USSR Professor Yu.Matveev, that hope was shaken to some extent...
However, there was no morning session, we were told that it was to be held after lunch. I understood from the mood of participants that the gathering would have no concrete result, the time had been wasted. Obviously, the aim of the meeting was to "probe" the feelings of the "outlying regions" in order to use them at the next "Moscow affair". After lunch we gathered again, but S.Shakhray was late. In anticipation of the meeting, participants were killing time trying to find out from each other the latest local news. However, the "public" was too diverse as for the level: from the Deputy Speaker of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan to the head of an office of the Foreign Ministry, as was the case with the delegation of Ukraine. A small waiting group, including Russians, stood in the corridor. Among them, as it turned out later, was one of the assistants of S.Shakhray. Finally, all began to disperse without having lived to see the meeting, duly commenting impudent attitude of the organizers of the meeting to the people from the republics.
I also left the gathering. I informed the Foreign Ministry about the failure of the trip and the next day, on 5 November, 1991, I took part in the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Union republics ... When it was over, I informed MFA by phone about the results and was ready to go home in the evening. But Kyiv informed me that at that time the final document of response visit of the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR Leonid Kravchuk to Moscow was being completed. Since I was in Moscow, A.Zlenko instructed me to finalize the text with the Russian Foreign Ministry, send it over to Kyiv for printing on the paper for agreements, and stay to assist during the signing of the document after the end of the visit.
Such a perspective frustrated my home plans, but anyway pleased me, because it meant that I would be able not to wait outside, but to be in the Kremlin itself for the talks with Boris Yeltsin! So I immediately contacted the Russians and we made minor amendments in it. In particular, it was agreed to refer in the document to the title of the Ukraine-Russia Treaty of 19 November, 1990, which existed before the aforementioned edition by B.Yeltsin.
And it should be noted that Ukraine was negotiating at that time separate agreements as for relations with Poland, Hungary, and Romania. Their signing was meant to be completed before 1 December, 1991 – the day of the national referendum. We wanted to show the world and our own people that the issue of Ukraine's independence was an accomplished fact and perceived by our neighbours for granted. Accordingly, the draft Ukraine-Russia Communique as for its subject and nature was, in fact, a kind of document – an agreement between two sovereign nations. Certainly, many of the provisions of the 1990 Treaty were repeated and developed there. However, it contained absolutely new aspects. Thus the Communique for the first time contained the provision that the RSFSR and Ukraine came out of the feasibility of considering "the issue of legal succession with regard to international treaties of the USSR." Hence, careful observers could have seen the prospect of very fast disappearance of the USSR as a subject of international law. Its competence in international relations was to pass over to the union republics. That was evidenced by other provisions of the Communique as well. In particular, the confirmation of readiness "to adhere to the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Limitation and Reduction of Strategic Offensive Weapons of 1991 and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 1990, as far as it concerns armaments located on their territory." Moreover, the parties agreed to work for the soonest possible formalizing of the gradual course on comprehensive cooperation in the military and political sphere. They agreed on the creation of national armies and the National Guards within a mutually agreed strength. After finalization of the text of the Communique, I showed it to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR A.Kozyryev who had not yet left the mansion, and asked if he agreed with its contents. Having quickly looked through the text, he agreed with it, but still asked to show one paragraph to his deputy A.I.Kolosovsky. The latter was close by and after reviewing the text proposed to delete the provisions concerning disarmament. After that I reported to Kyiv about fulfilling the task.
A.Zlenko asked me to wait a bit, so that he could report to Leonid Kravchuk. Very quickly I received response about his approval of the text of the final document. Our colleagues, who participated in the meeting and, like me still lingered on a small protocol event, had natural interest in the content of the document, which was to be signed the next day between the leaders of Ukraine and Russia. At the request of a Belarussian, whom I knew for we had worked together at the 1st session of the UN General Assembly, I showed the draft to him. While he was reading, a tall man with a beard and mustache in kosovorotka (Russian national shirt with collar fastening on one side) came up. Somehow he seemed to me a typical Old Believer, as they were portrayed in the Soviet films. He asked me to show the document to him as well. Of course, as I did not know the man properly, I refused to do it. Then he introduced himself as Fedor Shelov-Kovedyayev, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR. Having specific appearance, double surname which was a rarity for the Ukrainian bureaucracy at that time, being a member of the Russian Parliament, he behaved very arrogantly, even scornfully to some extent, addressing us "mister" rather than "comrade" which was also rather peculiar.
After the Belorussian read the document I handed it over to F.Shelov- Kovedyayev. He practically did not read either the first or the second page, but said that the document needed correcting. Such a statement, made with a very serious look, was accepted by me as a good joke. Wishing to keep up the conversation in that vein, I said that, although the document had already been approved by A.Kozyryev and Leonid Kravchuk, I would agree to carry on working to get the blessing even from the Lord. Highly raised eyebrows of the interlocutor made me doubt whether I tuned in the correct wave. With the tone of pastor bringing back the stray sheep to the fold, the interlocutor stressed that his high position did not allow him to spend his precious time on jokes.
Such a turn fully confirmed my doubts. I realized that I was dealing with a person with specific views on life and ways of communicating with others, especially when those persons are provincially distant from Moscow. So without any hesitation I changed to a simple сompellingly logical language of bureaucrat. I reminded him that the draft communiqué had been approved by his minister and my head of the Parliament. According to all imaginable and unwritten rules and standards of regional, continental, and global bureaucracy it could not be changed by Deputy Minister and common and mortal employee of the MFA .-- Contrary to my expectations for full surrender to such seemingly "killer" argument, Shelov- Kovedyayev said that he was not just the first deputy minister, but also B.Yeltsin's special representative in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR. He seemed to be a kind of a commissioner. Therefore, the O.K. of A.Kozyryev did not mean anything. It was important that the document was agreed by H.Burbulis. And he believed that without making some alterations to the communiqué, the Russian Secretary of State would not "give it a go-ahead". If Burbulis does not agree, then there will be no L. Kravchuk's visit to Moscow.
My heart was filled with gnawing doubts that the agreement between L.Kravchuk and B.Yeltsin could be broken by G.Burbulis, the Russian leader’s subordinate. The Soviet bureaucracy in my understanding then could not even imagine that. But you never know… Who knows what new сustoms have appeared in the White-Stone Moscow under the democracy? It was getting hot. And a flawless instinct of bureaucrat went off: that would be a bit too thick if they would accuse me of disrupting the first official visit of the Chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament to Moscow! I informed Kyiv. B.Tarasyuk was on the line. He gave the details about such a turn of events to A.Zlenko for reporting to Leonid Kravchuk. Without waiting for the answer and hoping to settle the case for some half an hour, I went to Shelov- Kovedyayev to the Staraya Square, where the Russian Foreign Ministry had already moved to.
I was familiar with the Kyiv scale and, of course, I was struck by the size of his office. It seemed like a football pitch, where a long table with chairs, apparently for meetings, was put. A desk with a chair stood nearby. And that was all. My attention was attracted to the butt wall with a crucifix on it. Beneath there was an elegant wooden support with a Bible. Realizing that there was not too much time to agree on possible amendments to the communiqué, send them to Kyiv until the working day was not over there and get “go-ahead” with "scolding", I suggested to get to work. My interlocutor accepted the proposal as commentary of a barbarian in the temple, and said that we would start talking only when coffee would be brought.
Finally, the coffee was ready and I heard the first "revelations of Fedor". He proposed to change numerous provisions of the document. Some of them had editorial nature and did not make up problems, but among them I found out some more substantial ones, most of which were absolutely unacceptable for me after the first encounter with them. The most controversial seemed to me, in particular, the proposal to introduce a new provision to the communiqué, according to which "the Ukrainian SSR recognizes the special interests of the RSFSR in the Crimea, Donbass and Novorussia."
First, I decided to reject the proposal only due to formal reasons, without getting to its essence. I denied the possibility of using in bilateral agreements terms that did not reflect the administrative division of Ukraine. After all it was clear to some extent, concerning the names of the first two Ukrainian regions. But including the term of "Novorussia" in the official document was too much.
My interlocutor showed surprisingly good knowledge of history according to monographs by Kliuchevsky and Solovyov. He explained that Novorussia included at least Odessa, Kherson, and Mykolayiv provinces.
They were at one time conquered by the soldiers of the Russian Empire. As we are drafting a brand new document, which will reflect the new quality of relations between our countries, it is necessary to lay there such provisions which would testify the role of the new Russia as the heir to the Russian Empire.
It was very unusual to hear such words from a man of Yeltsin’s team at that time. After all, we saw that team as an ally in forming new principles of relations between the republics of the former Soviet Union. We envisaged the opportunity to witness the transformation of the Union, which would result in complete change of the nature of relations between the Soviet republics. We saw such relations as something really friendly, sympathetic, human, and, of course, really equal. In fact, I felt stiffness, suspicion, and blatant desire to dominate.
We two were sitting in a large office, with his assistant coming in from time to time. My partner was in no hurry. He was confident that in the near future B.Yeltsin would take the Moscow steering wheel in his hands, shared my vision of the historical process and the independence of Ukraine. He knew about the historical attempts to gain Ukrainian independence, was very well informed about the composition of political prisoners on a national basis at the Soviet era. He seemed to feel sympathy for millions of Ukrainians who had passed through the GULAG Archipelago. He wanted at that time to lay provisions in the Ukraine-Russia document that would "guarantee" the rights and interests of Russia in Ukraine in the case it could become fully independent. All my objections and attempts to convince him that it was inappropriate to include such passages into the communiqué, he managed to find historical counterarguments.
The conversation was dragging on. The 9 p.m. train to Kyiv had already departed. Our debates were held without witnesses and gradually moved to midnight. To some extent, that night, the realization of unusual character of the talk created some special atmosphere. As a diplomat I found myself for the first time in a situation, where I had to negotiate without having public instructions. Therefore, I was only guided with my own understanding of the "moment". Somehow the conversation resembled acquaintance in a train, when you know that you will never in your life see the person you are talking to. And this in itself promotes mutual openness.
During the discussion we learned each other's outlook. I received from his argument a sample of political attitudes and desires of the new Russian elite, representatives of its wings, who called themselves "democratic". He gave a pretty ice-cold lesson - warning about the nature of our relations in the future as independent states. It was interesting and a bit scary, like in a troublesome prophetic dream: that was when I truly felt how difficult would be Ukraine-Russia relations after our independence. Certainly, if Ukrainians would not blindly and unconditionally follow the lead of Moscow. And we had no such intentions. I knew it from my own dreams and hopes. I felt it even in the hearts of those in Ukraine who until then did not even seriously asked themselves - how to live after independence? But rapid time raised that question before everyone.
Gradually, I realized that a simple reference to the need to build Ukrainian-Russian relations on mutual trust, respect of each other, mutual understanding, i.e. what was officially proclaimed by our Communist Party tenets, would lead to nothing. It was not a friend who was sitting in front of me, but a representative of another country with ambitious understanding of their own global national interests. He had clear and cold calculation for the future, suspicion and mistrust to us, strict persuasion in the need of creating the foundations for the following domination of the Greater Russia in the third millennium.
It was necessary to immediately get rid of "brotherhood" illusions and negotiate the way it was done with representatives of independent states. And that awareness was both unpleasant and easing. It was unpleasant for killing although unrealistic, but sweet misleading, illusory hope for problem-free, cloudless, fraternal relations between our peoples after sinking into oblivion of Gorbachev’s Empire. It was easing for proved the proximity of freedom, opened up the possibility to tune to the same wave of negotiations with the interlocutor, enter into the field, where I had some experience, and as I thought, certain advantage and could feel at ease.
So putting away the remnants of the years of Soviet veil on the nature of inter-republican relations, I recalled F. Shelov-Kovedyayev one of the basic rules for the equitable bilateral intergovernmental documents: they must be balanced. Therefore, after failing to connect over the phone with the Foreign Ministry in Kyiv, at my own risk I agreed with the content of the formulation proposed by Shelov-Kovedyayev. But if he would agree for his part, that Russia "recognizes the special interests of Ukraine in Kuban, Slobozhanshchina, and the Green Wedge."
Here it was my turn to fill gaps in the knowledge of my interlocutor. I reminded him the story of the settlement of Kuban and the moods that prevailed among the people of the land in 1917 in favour of joining Ukraine. I told him about the seizure of a major part of the territory of Ukraine ceded to the contemporary Kursk and Belgorod provinces with the help of the decisions of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party, wiping out by the Stalinist regime of the Far Eastern republic of the Green Wedge inhabited by ninety-five percent of Ukrainian immigrants, and which at one time had a representative in Kyiv. At that time I had enough details about the formation of the territory and borders of Ukraine, because the day before in Kyiv the Institute of History had issued a special study on the topic for official use following the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine.
However, my exercise in rhetoric looked like a dialogue of a dumb with a deaf. My interlocutor sought to fix only Russian interests in the communiqué. Search for any compromise formula ended in nothing. About midnight I informed Kyiv, about the negotiation. B.Tarasyuk told me about concerns of the leadership as for those developments, but it was not possible to suggest a way out. All had left offices and were at home. We agreed that I would continue to convince the Russian.
After 3 a.m. and coffee, a feeling of some particularly sharp clarity dawned in the head. The conversation became very explicit. My interlocutor, I thought, received some pathological satisfaction of knowing that I had allegedly no other way out, but giving up. After 5 a.m. there loomed the prospect that it would be impossible to avoid scandal with the speaker’s visit. So I said that at my own risk and responsibility I would accept his variant of the controversial provision of the Communiqué (of course, subject to final approval by L. Kravchuk), but with only one addition: the Ukrainian side recognizes the special interests of Russia in the Crimea, Donetsk and Kherson regions, while the Russian side "recognizes the special rights of Ukraine to Moscow."
The interlocutor even after a sleepless night choked on coffee and reacted quite specifically. I said in all seriousness: Moscow was founded by Yuriy The Long Hand, a son of the Grand Prince of Kyiv, whose tomb is in Kyiv. And by the way, Yuri The Long Hand bought the land for Moscow from Kyiv boyar Ivan Kuchma, who had already owned it.
Either my arguments turned out to be so simple and compelling, or the time had a beneficial effect or the very absurdity of the dispute became clearer in the morning, but then interlocutor agreed not to insist on his formula to ensure Russian interests! The document remained the same as it was at the beginning of the night negotiating marathon. I was tired and called the Permanent Mission for the car and left the Staraya Square. Water carts were coming in the opposite direction and watering asphalt. I rolled down the window on the back door of Volga. The morning autumn air stream softly flew into the cabin. And although it carried the whole range of smells of a big city, but after a sleepless office absurd atmosphere I enjoyed it ...
Later, when I spoke about this episode to an acquaintance of mine from Georgia, he said: "I am not sure, who of you is right, but The Long Hand was a smart guy, if he founded Moscow around Georgian restaurant Aragvi... "
We met the delegation headed by L. Kravchuk in the morning of 6 November. I felt like in a dream in the hectic atmosphere of the meeting of high officials after a sleepless night. But the complex of reverence for the capital of the empire implanted for decades dominated. And, certainly, I wanted to visit for the first time the Kremlin, which I read and heard so much about. However, given the presence of so many senior officials, it was not excluded that I would not be able to get there. When it turned out that I had to be at the meeting, of course, I was happy for such an occasion...
The motorcade entered the Kremlin on the way from the airport at high speed. Later it repeated many times and always combined with the unpleasant expectation of brutal force pressure and readiness for confrontation. But then, for the first time, even after an exhausting night of confrontation, I wanted to feel the most important moment not only myself, but to share that feeling with others. So I curiously watched from the car how it was perceived by people in the streets. They were accustomed to such motorcades, and seemed to be busy with their own problems, not paying any attention to it ...
Following wide stairs lined with the red carpet, we entered a hall. Then came some passages, they seemed to me endless. As it turned out, at the same time M.Gorbachev was receiving some delegation at the USSR level and the primary care of the Kremlin protocol in that situation was to prevent the overlapping of the two ceremonies.
Finally we came to a wide hall where R.Hasbulatov took care of the Ukrainian delegation. Some parts of his clothes struck the eyes: checkered jacket, stripped shirt, messy knotted tie, trousers that needed ironing with bulging hemispheres on the knees. They stopped us, most likely to separate us from M. Gorbachev. But, obviously, the protocol services of Russian and the USSR structures did not actively cooperate. For before we again welcomed Khasbulatov, Revenko appeared from the other corridor, followed by M.Gorbachev with a group of people. Seeing us with R.Hasbulatov, the first and the last Soviet president accelerated and approached Khasbulatov, shook his hand for a long time, not letting it go of his hands. The zeal with which the President of the Soviet Union looked in the eyes and clearly sought Khasbulatov’s benevolence struck me. It seemed that Khasbulatov himself did not feel very comfortable due to such a stressed attention.
The situation was cleared with the approach by B.Yeltsin and his suite. Having seen them approaching, M.Gorbachev left our group. Only Revenko, the former head of the Kyiv province, remained for a certain time there, exchanging remarks with his Ukrainian countrymen, when B.Yeltsin welcomed L.Kravchuk.
We were in the Kyiv Rus, but for 500 years we were separated, for more than 100 years we were struggling, being autonomous, for 250 years we were under the yoke, then 10 years of independence. History is for historians. But it should be known.
________
*Information about the Author:
Mr. Anton Buteyko, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (1995- 1998, 2005 - 2006).