The Foreign Policy Research Institute of the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine offers a new edition on the present Russia-Ukraine war at the discretion of readers - the book by G.M. Perepelytsia “Ukraine - Russia: War in Terms of Coexistence”.
Very few could believe that in the 21st century, a period of stability in Europe, and 25 years of independent Ukrainian state, Russia would dare to open an insidious military aggression against Ukraine. It was the treacherous attack by"big brother" that prompted many in Ukraine and abroad to reconsider our "brotherly" relations with Russia. This desire of reconsidering led the author to clarify the nature of this relationship and study the roots and the driving forces that move Russia-Ukraine relations into conflict and the highest form of its manifestation - the war.
In general, Russia-Ukraine relations constitute rather complex conglomerate of relationships, contradictions and trends, which is difficult to describe relying only on one methodological approach. This could result in a risk of one-sided coverage of this complex of bilateral relations. Moreover, Ukraine-Russia relations do not fit into the format of bilateral relations, as it is commonly seen in the context of interactionistic approach. Their profoundness and significance are so great that they often become a subject of multilateral relations and may influence regional systems of international relations.
Obviously, this historical significance already has not only the motivation for unity in itself, but also carries a huge conflict potential. Objects or areas that are of vital public or material importance are mostly also a subject of conflicts at the same time. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of Ukraine-Russia relations cannot be complete and self-sufficient without determining this conflict agenda.
Another question, which the author raises in this book - what prevails in this relationship - harmony or proneness to conflict? It is impossible to build up policy and determine further prospects of relations without clarifying this issue. The study has shown that conflictogenous character of Russia-Ukraine relations lies in the very nature of national interest of Russia, based on a strong spiritual basis of imperial consciousness of Russian society. There is a powerful query in Russian socium for such an aggressive Russian policy. Imperial consciousness of Russian society in its turn is a conflictogenous source both in domestic and foreign policy, since such a claim cannot be accepted by other subjects of international relations.
Such an imperial policy can certainly provide hegemony, but cannot ensure prosperity of the Russian people. For the development of any empire consists of three phases: expansion - hegemony - decline. Changing these phases is due to a permanent change of balance and imbalance of forces in regional and global system of international relations. In its history, Russia as an imperial state is entering the third cycle of repetition of these phases. The end of the first cycle led to the partial collapse of the Russian Empire in the early 20-th century as a result of changes in the balance of forces resulting from the World War I. Its second renaissance started with the new expansion of Bolshevik Russia to the territories of Ukraine, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Baltic states, which ended with the establishment of the Soviet Union. Following the World War II, there was a new change in the balance of power in the global system of international relations, due to which the Soviet Union achieved hegemony over half the world, taking place of a superpower in the global hierarchy of international relations. The end of the Cold War resulted in a new change of the balance of power that led to the decline and with time the collapse of the USSR.
In the so-called post-bipolar period a new imbalance in power was formed in favour of the West, but not Russia. It is this imbalance that has led to the loss of status of superpower by Russia and its sliding to the place of an average state in the hierarchy of international relations. It is obvious that such a status could not meet the imperial interests of Russia, which remained permanent at all times of its existence, regardless of their feasibility. Meanwhile, in addition to imperial ambitions in this historical period, Russia retained one of the attributes of superpower strength - nuclear weapons. It gave Russia hope to reconsider the balance of power established as a result of the Cold War, or vice versa imbalance from the Russian point of view: to regain the lost status of the global power.
Thus, the third cycle of reconstruction of the Russian state as the empire began with V.Putin coming to power in 2000, who began restoration of the imperial model of Russia with the new expansion at the post-Soviet space, as well as the surrounding international environment, using available at the time economic, political, energy, financial, cultural and informational means. The purpose of this expansion is to achieve complete hegemony at the post-Soviet area, spreading there full authority of the Russian state, then to set Russian hegemony all over Eurasia. The Kremlin plans that it would allow to get rid of “the geopolitical catastrophe of Russia”, which occurred as a result of the break-up of the USSR and to regain later its place in the world hierarchy of international relations. Although, the main obstacle to this goal proved to be Ukraine as an independent and sovereign state. Removing this obstacle by economic and cultural, as well as energy, economic and information warfare proved insufficient. The latter means with the help of which Russia is trying to achieve its goal in solving the geopolitical problems of Ukraine, has become military aggression. Analysis of the situation resulting from the Russian military aggression against Ukraine in this new third cycle of reproduction of the Russian Empire in the 21-th century, leads to a conclusion about a fatal mistake of the West in relations with Russia. Instead of disarming Ukraine, the West would have claimed complete nuclear disarmament of Russia and not trying to democratize its political regime.
Thus, the general methodological review of the nature of the national interest of Russia enables us to move to the main and more important question: how is the national interest interpreted and implemented in relations with Ukraine and what place does it occupy in the structure of the interest? Answers to these questions allow us to resolve the basic dilemma of Ukraine-Russia relations: war or peaceful coexistence between Ukraine and Russia as independent nations. If a classic of American geopolitics N. Spykmen says that the conflict at the international environment is more typical than cooperation, then the question arises before Ukrainians how to survive in the war against Russia and to retain their national sovereignty? In case of coexistence – then under what conditions it is possible and how long and stable it can be? The history of Ukraine-Russia relations shows that coexistence of the two independent states is possible, but only in a relatively short historical period, in the periods of weakness of Russia and respectively with the establishment of a new balance of forces at the international arena against this background which actually secured the power imbalances that emerged between Russia and the West for the benefit of the latter.
The nature of Ukraine-Russia relations is due primarily to antagonistic national interests of Ukraine and Russia. The book indicates: what exactly is the essence of this antagonism? If interests of the Ukrainian and Russian sides as subjects of the Russia-Ukraine conflict are of antagonistic nature, then there is the third otological question: what needs of the parties form the interests in the process of bilateral Ukraine-Russia interaction? The needs, in turn, are shaped by the environment in which conflicting entities exist and develop in the process of their relationship. This in turn brings us to the need of retrospective analysis of the emergence of relations between Ukraine and Russia and the evolution of their historical development.
In fact, this analysis shows that the antagonism between Ukraine and Russia appeared to begin with the emergence and establishment of Ukraine-Russia relations and has existed for over 600 years. The main subject of the Russia-Ukraine conflict causing antagonistic contradictions between the two sides of the relations is the issue of identity. Hence we can conclude that the Russia-Ukraine conflict is a clash of opposing identities. Moreover, according to dialectical theory, this means having alternative identities in relationships which at the same time allow the existence of each other as part of bilateral relations (object) and the nature of these relationships is only in unity. These identities can exist only in unity, because their collision and struggle are impossible without the unity.
The struggle between these identities is the essence of the Russia-Ukraine conflict as the ultimate state of Ukraine-Russia relations. It is in the process of mutual exclusion that each identity is formed. So basically this very substance of the identity as a whole makes a unity of opposites: similarities and differences. Thus, Russia-Ukraine conflict, in its deep essence, is a clash of Russian and Ukrainian identities, which are in unity in the relationship, and thus are in eternal struggle. This situation stipulates at the same time them, their coexistence, and war - the war in terms of coexistence. Coexistence in this sense is a prerequisite for their struggle.
The subject of antagonism in the conflict of identities is "land" as a habitat that is treated as "the Russian land", "state" as a space of power and its "international status" as a geopolitical space; "society" as "the Russian people" having their cultural and historical space which is treated as "the Russian world" or "Slavic world". These subjects of Russia-Ukraine conflict make fundamental interest for both Russians and Ukrainians, for they are simultaneously subject of the identification of their territory as a habitat, the nation, their statehood, and their place in the international environment. Thus, the conflict of identities has a systematic, antagonistic character, for it is a clash of interests or claims for the same object or the same space.
The struggle for these spaces or place in it makes the Russia-Ukraine conflict extremely acute and long-term, in which the implementation of interests of one party is carried out at the expense of preventing the interests of the other. In this situation, the identification of one side with regard to the subject of conflict is denying the identity of the other party as for the same subject. On this basis, four circles of antagonisms can be identified: small circle (central) - antagonism as for habitat ("land"); middle circle - antagonism as for the power ("statehood"); large circle - antagonism as for national identities ( "nation, people"); mega circle - antagonism over the place in international relations (entity, status). All four circles of antagonisms are interlinked into a single knot and constantly feed off each other while conflict is developing.
The retrospective analysis presented in this book shows that the war between Russia and Ukraine ended in defeat of the latter, when she relied exclusively on external factors. Analysis of the combination of external and internal factors enabled the author to present the forecast of the Russia - Ukraine war and its consequences for both countries and peoples. The book concludes that further development of Russia-Ukraine conflict will be determined by two principal trends: first, Russia will continue to abide by strategies of controlled chaos and controlled escalation, but move to a more moderate scenarios of their implementation; second, there will be erosion of oligarchic and kleptocratic regime and weakening of Ukraine in general. Thus, the most probable scenario of the Russia-Ukraine war in the short- and medium-term will be the scenario of "escalating low intensity combat operations" with possible seizure of some more territories of Ukraine by Russian troops to force Ukraine to amend the Constitution of Ukraine, "adding autonomous DPR /LPR as a constituent part of Ukraine, electing pro-Russian MPs at their territories, further federalization of Ukraine, formation of Odessa and Kharkiv autonomous republics by means of a referendum, protection of all Russian-culture citizens of Ukraine and, ultimately, reunification of Russia and Ukraine (subjects of South-East Ukraine)."¹ Obviously, the scenario of absorption of Ukraine "by a large-scale war" recede into the background, as it would be quite risky for V.Putin, since this scenario does not guarantee results.
As for the Ukrainian side, post-maydan authorities have no strategy for their behaviour in the Russia-Ukraine war due to the absence of strategic thinking. The problem is that the kleptocratic elite is not able to think of national interests, and thus to shape and solve strategic tasks. Prevailing business interests and the desire to strengthen personal power relieves and eliminates the possibility for the leadership of the country to develop and implement plans of waging war against aggressor. So in the short and medium term Ukrainian authorities will try to stick to the neither-war-nor-peace scenario, which in case of significant escalation of military operations will move to the loss-of-certain-areas scenario.
The key point in changing scenarios of the Russia-Ukraine war would be 2018. The prerequisites for such a change will be: deepening economic crisis in Russia, which will coincide with the period of new presidential election of V.Putin in Russia; culminating effect of Western sanctions against Russia, even if they are abolished in 2017; presidential election campaign in Ukraine, changing European elite through presidential and parliamentary elections in the EU and other events. So the prediction for a greater depth in the longer term is impossible without taking into account more powerful external factors that would determine the relationship between the West and Russia.
In the short and medium-term till 2018-2020, it is likely that the trend of further weakening of the West and Ukraine and strengthening Russia would remain. As Russia has managed to withstand the negative effects of the falling world oil prices and the introduction of Western sanctions, reducing investments and manpower. In 2016 the Russian economy began to emerge from recession. The GDP began to grow slowly (by 0.3%), inflation slowed down, the growth in real incomes of the people and companies resumed, rate of exchange of the Russian ruble stabilized.
The hybrid war of Russia against the West has also brought it considerable success. The USA has become significantly more dependent on Russia in solving international security problems, rather than vice versa. The problem of the nuclear programme of Iran, the war in Syria, fighting ISIL are a clear proof of that. Europe has become more sensitive with the implementation of their sanctions against Russia than vice versa. Obviously, Europe will eventually abandon such sanctions and will encourage Russia to return to economic cooperation. Russia has significantly enhanced anti-Western forces in Europe, mostly due to the Russian propaganda, thus depriving the US, NATO and EU of political, economic and military strategic advantages at the post-Soviet area.
The hybrid war of Russia has significantly enhanced the crisis of the EU and the growth of disintegration trends within the community. Stimulation of Syrian refugees in Europe, anti-American and Eurosceptical sentiments among the EU member states can be considered real non-military victories of Russia over the West. Russia managed to block the ratification of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU by the Dutch referendum, and NATO was forced to refuse to move further eastward. To a larger extent the West will demonstrate an increasing willingness to restore relations with Russia on a business-is-business principle, forgetting about their civilizational values and the sanctity of international law.
NATO has failed to adequately and promptly respond to the Russian military threat. NATO has allowed their servicemen to fall into decay, and it turned from defence to political and security organization. Instead of shifting to the strategy of regional deterrence of Russia, NATO is trying to convert it to strategic partnership, showing psychological unwillingness of the Alliance to confront with Russia and moreover to wage war against it. Russia understands it as a psychological surrender of the Alliance, further instigating its aggressive intentions.
In the medium term, Russia will increase its military presence near the borders of NATO and arrange permanent military provocations. Anti-NATO hysteria will be built up in the country, and NATO will be cast into discredit among the people of Europe. Making NATO a bogey of the principal threat, the Russian leadership will be convincing its citizens that repelling this threat would require the increase of military spending, giving up economic modernization and reducing social costs. At the same time such a militaristic propaganda will strengthen fears in Europe of possible war between Russia and NATO, leading to a loss of solidarity in actions of the organization aimed at ensuring collective defence. These actions of Russia will push the West to agree to establish a new order from the position of strength, moreover that the balance of forces on the eastern borders of NATO has already shifted in favour of Russia.
Escalation of any military political crisis, up to a full-fledged war becomes possible based on this balance of power in the medium term after increasing military presence. This scenario seems quite possible in the medium term in case of aggravation of the crisis. In this situation the territory of Ukraine, as it has been already mentioned, can become a theater of large-scale war. In the long run, judging from the trends outlined in the late first and early second decade of the 21st century there will be both degradation of Russia and subsequent disintegration of the West, leading to weakening external influence of both key players.
The third decade will see a wave of the economic crisis in Russia, resulted from the negative impact of economic sanctions, large investment projects will be curtailed, there will be increase of the deficit of the national budget, stabilization fund will be exhausted, investments into export-oriented industries will be substantially reduced, if not stop at all. There will be a gradual reduction of the working population and productivity of labor will fall. As a result, it would be extremely difficult to execute ambitious military programmes, which again would lead to falling combat readiness of the armed forces and military capacity of Russia.
Therefore, Russia may not have enough forces and resources to rebuild it on its own terms and according to its own vision, either by destroying the world order, or at least its European part. And then Russia itself will sink in this international chaos which must sweep over its own territory as well. Ukraine will have to survive on its own in the international chaos, fighting both against internal challenges of agonizing oligarchic and kleptocratic regime and external challenges of Russia-Ukraine war, the most likely outcome and course of which would be neither-peace-nor-war scenario and Somalia scenario depending on the ability of both parties to continue this war.
Strengthening Ukraine is possible at the turn of 2020-2025 at the time of agony of oligarchic and kleptocratic regime to be replaced by a new generation of the Ukrainian national elite, which can conduct efficient reforms in the country, and total-war scenario will become possible to restore the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine at the occupied territories.
Otherwise, if it does not happen and oligarchic and kleptocratic system will be strengthened in the country, poverty of the people will be aggravated and social sentiments will be radicalized with degradation of spiritual foundations of the Ukrainian nation. This could lead to the possibility that pro-Russian forces may come back to power during the next presidential election, if the war continues. In this situation the Russian-Ukrainian war would inevitably result in “satelization” scenario, which would ultimately lead to negative or fatal consequences that Ukraine experienced in its history more than once. To avoid this scenario, Ukrainians must get rid of a significant drawback.
The problem is that Ukrainians do not feel danger in coexistence with Russia, living with perfidious and arrogant neighbor, who cannot accept their dissimilarity and the right to have their own house, their land and their freedom. The threat for Ukraine's future lies not in the number and strength of the Russian armies, but in the absence of a sense of danger that permanently comes from Russia and that the Russian authorities are trying to implement when opportunity offers. The nature of these inherent drawbacks lies in the perception of Russia by the ruling elite and part of the Ukrainian society as of their second fatherland, and Russians as fraternal people. The image of "big brother" for centuries was implanted and propagated in consciousness of Ukrainians, not allowing them to really understand the deadly threat that comes from such a "brotherhood." This myth of the "brotherhood" does not allow Ukrainians to perceive Russia as "the enemy", and the Russian people as invaders. This congenital blindness of Ukrainians explains why the treacherous policy in relations with Ukraine is much more successful than open warfare on the battlefield. So it is time to see clearly - sums up the book.
Thus, the book reveals the background and evolution of Russia-Ukraine conflict, strategic goals and interests of Ukraine and Russia in the war, specific features of hybrid warfare, strategy and tactics of the parties in the war and its international implications. We hope that the readers will find answers to these crucial questions in this book.
If you are interested in the book, you can order it at the Foreign Policy Research Institute of Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine, Kyiv, 2 Zhytomyrska str.
Tel .: +380 (68) 0176014
References:
[1] Temirgaliyev revealed the plans of the Kremlin as for establishing new “republics” in Ukraine. http://hvylya.net/news/exclusive/temirgaliev-raskryil-planyi-kremlya-o-sozdanii-novyih-respublik-v-ukraine.html