Holding a UN peacekeeping operation at the Ukrainian territory of the Donbass occupied by Russia (hereinafter - the peacekeeping operation) has long been in the focus of attention of international and local public. As you know, it was discussed at the meetings of the UN Security Council, and it has also become a subject of several rounds of ongoing talks between US representatives (K.Volker) and the Russian Federation (V.Surkov)[i]. A number of substantive public events and publications have been devoted to the issue also by the Ukrainian expert circles.
In general, it can be stated that foreign and local politicians, diplomats, and experts see the peacekeeping operation as the way out of the impasse, which the situation with ensuring sustainable peace in the Donbass has reached today. Moreover, with a few exceptions, such an operation is considered as the means of automatically achieving a positive result that does not have serious security risks.
Meanwhile, as folk wisdom says, any coin has two sides. Accordingly, a peacekeeping operation cannot but bear in itself certain negative moments that need to be identified and analyzed. Critical consideration of the idea of a peacekeeping operation through the prism of potential negativity is needed, at least in order to avoid, figuratively speaking, paving the way to hell with good intentions, and be prepared to minimize the consequences of possible unwanted developments in Ukraine. This critical approach is particularly important, for we are dealing with Russia, which has turned hypocrisy and fraud into virtues and principles of its state policy. If the Russian Federation offers something or agrees to something - it means that it has matured to the next meanness. Thus, if it offers a peacekeeping operation and has agreed to negotiations on this issue, then there might be probably rather dangerous pitfalls for Ukraine. So, our task is to find, "where the crux of the matter is". Therefore, let us try, at least at a glance, to identify some of the potential threats to Ukraine's security that are somehow linked to a hypothetical peacekeeping operation.
Considering that the latter is a means of overcoming the consequences of Russian aggression against Ukraine, it is important to understand, first of all, what Russia, the official initiator of the idea of peacekeeping, seeks to gain by this operation? What does the Russian Federation see as its purpose and main tasks? A useful material for answering these questions is provided by the recently published article by a group of the Russian "intellectuals"[1], headed by Academician Arbatov, in the far from being ordinary Russian edition of Rossiyskaya Gazeta, the founder of which is the government of the Russian Federation (See: https://rg.ru/ 2018/01/15 / kak-prodvinutsia-v-uregulirovanii-konflikta-na-iugo-vostoke-ukrainy.html). There is no doubt that the authors speak for the Kremlin, preparing Russians and the international community for certain "peacekeeping" foreign policy steps and initiatives. These are the realities of the controlled democracy in Russia.
The above publication states that peacekeeping operation "makes sense only if it helps to move the Minsk process from the deadlock." According to the authors, the termination of the "armed confrontation in the south-east of Ukraine" would "put the implementation of the political aspects of the settlement of the conflict at the agenda", as it is foreseen by Minsk. In addition, the peacekeeping operation will push Kyiv to understanding that "it cannot endlessly rely on unconditional support from the West."
Thus, such an element of a peacekeeping operation, in itself, as the cessation of armed confrontation, as a result of which servicemen and civilians, Ukrainians and Russians perish almost every day, is of secondary importance for Russia and is not valued much. In principle, this is logical. After all, if the Kremlin wanted to prevent those victims, there would have been no brazen and demonstrative violations of numerous agreements on the ceasefire, including the Minsk Agreements (remember Debaltsevo). Although the results of the peacekeeping operation that are extremely valuable for Russia would be, as we can see, the implementation of the political part of the Minsk agreements, as well as the withdrawal of Ukraine's support from the West in confronting Russia in the Donbass.
So, let us try to understand the reason, what important for the Russian interests cause-and-effect relations are hidden in the triangle: "peacekeeping operation - the political part of the Minsk Agreements - the support of Ukraine by the West."
As for the Minsk Agreements, Russian interest in their implementation is quite understandable and has already been thoroughly analyzed by Ukrainian and foreign experts. The results of this analysis are well known to the readers of the Mirror Weekly, so there is no need to dwell on them in any detail. Neither the problem of validity of the Minsk Agreements will be touched, as our Western partners still consider them valid (let us recall at least the recent and, as for me, rather rude statement by a representative of Germany about the intention to analyze the Reintegration Law approved by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine as for its compliance to the above arrangements). We restrict ourselves to establishing two facts. First, the Minsk Agreements, in principle, cannot provide lasting peace and stability, since they leave out the initial cause of the war in the Donbass, which is, as it is known, an expansionist, imperial policy of Russia aimed at regaining the status of a superpower and the desire, in this context, to preserve in a violent way at least the geopolitical sphere of its influence in Europe, by subjugating itself, first of all, Ukraine by means of military aggression. Minsk Agreements do not eliminate this initial cause of the conflict. And second, the implementation of the political part of the Minsk Agreements (envisaging the creation of an enclave at the Ukrainian territory with its paramilitary armed formations kept at the expense of the Ukrainian budget, but in practice subordinated to Moscow, but not Kyiv) may have murderous consequences for the country and its future, given the current socio-economic and political instability in Ukraine, and result in considerably more blood than was shed during the period since the beginning of Russian aggression. It was for this reason that the Verkhovna Rada did not find enough votes for ratification of the Minsk Agreements, despite Western pressure, and, consequently, for the official acceptance by Ukraine of its obligations with regard to their implementation.
In fact, the Minsk Agreements are the means of non-military oppression of Ukraine by Russia, since the attempt of the latter to achieve this by force has failed. Therefore, the attention paid by the Russian side to the implementation of their political part is quite understandable. But what has it to do with the peacekeeping operation?
The point is in the tactics used until recently by Russia in order to force Ukraine to fulfill the political part of the Minsk Agreements, and the West - to press our country for the same purpose. The tactic was to periodically exacerbate the situation on the line of demarcation, as well as to regularly demonstrate the readiness of gangs formed and maintained by Russia at the occupied territories of the Donbass for large-scale offensive operations.
However, such actions of Russia, as often happens with it, have led to results exactly opposite of the expected. Over time, they have become an important and absolutely understandable argument for the international community in favour of the expediency of delaying implementation of the political section of Minsk by Ukraine. For, indeed, security conditions must first be ensured for this. And they are absent, and the Russian Federation is to blame. So what are the claims to Ukraine regarding the non-fulfillment of the Minsk Agreements, deep down?
Consequently, Moscow tactics of "periodic escalation", in fact, caused the suspension of the implementation of the political part of the Minsk Agreements. As it is said, they have brought problems upon themselves ...
Certainly, it would be easy for the Russian Federation to change this tactic to the opposite, so to say, to "ensure security", aimed at the complete cessation of armed conflicts, compliance with the agreements on the withdrawal of heavy weapons, and the withdrawal of its armed groups from the occupied territory. Thus, necessary security conditions for the implementation of the political part of the Minsk agreements would have been made. However, the Kremlin does not need peace, but control over the territories of Ukraine. Meanwhile, the tactic of "ensuring security" with high probability would lead to Moscow's loss of such control, and Kyiv would establish a real, rather than formal, sovereignty over the ORDLO. The Kremlin's control over the political processes in these districts of the Donbass, at least, would have been severely limited. This would also apply to the possibility of unhindered promotion of their sympathizers and agents to local self-government bodies during the election envisaged for by the Minsk Agreements. So it means - farewell, the cunning Minsk plan, farewell, cherished Malorossia ... Well, and there is nothing to say about personal image losses for the "firm and unflinching" "gatherer of the Russian lands" in the event of such a development.
However, Russia remains Russia and stubbornly stands on its own, regardless of what foolish things it would have done. Therefore, I think, there appeared a new idea: to change the tactics, reorienting to the implementation of the political part of the Minsk Agreements through a peacekeeping operation. And frankly speaking, this variant of the development of the situation is completely devoid of the disadvantages of the previous one, but also puts almost a halo of a sort of a peacemaker around Russia.
Deployment of the international contingent, no matter where - throughout the ORDLO, or only, along the delimitation line, to begin with - will mean the implementation of the security part of the Minsk Agreements and put on the agenda the issue of the practical implementation of their political component. At the same time, Kyiv will not regain control over de-occupied Ukrainian territories. They will remain in the hands of the current "leadership" (those or other Russian protagonists, the names do not matter). The fact is that the practice of conducting peacekeeping operations involves signing the document that would guarantee security of the international contingent, on the one hand, by the international organization that conducts such an operation, and on the other hand - the parties to the conflict,. In our case such a guarantee should be provided by ORDLO and Ukraine. Sending peronnel by the contributing United Nations member-states to the mission is problematic without signing such a document by the ORDLO, and this was rightly stressed in the already mentioned publication of the Rossiyskaya Gazeta. The signing of such a document will be another step towards legitimizing the "leadership" of the ORDLO, which has to be formally responsible in this case for the security of peacekeepers and remain at their positions until the formation of local self-government bodies on the basis of legitimate, internationally recognized elections. Perhaps some part of the control will be transferred to the interim international administration (the UN / OSCE structure), in particular, as far as it concerns the organization of the electoral process. Though the same "local activists" will work with these structures, first of all, (putting the right people to the necessary posts at these territories is much easier under the international administration than inflating a Russian spy e.g. into the office of the Ukrainian Prime Minister). In any case, the hands of the Russian agents evident and not so evident will remain untied. The protagonists and mere supporters of Russia will confidently occupy the main offices at the elections to local self-government bodies, which Kyiv is obliged to hold quite promptly according to the Minsk Agreements, and they would rule the ORDLO rather long. The Kremlin will secure its control over the newly elected and, this time legitimate, administrative structures, and will also shift the burden of financing the "deocupied" territories onto Ukraine and international structures. The main strategy of the Minsk Agreements will be implemented, as they say, by hook or by crook. And then - see above about the fatalities for Ukraine of this implementation.
Thus, the first threat to the national security of Ukraine, which is carried by the peacekeeping operation, is connected with putting on the agenda practical implementation by Kyiv of the political part of the Minsk Agreements, in view of the fulfillment of their security component.
Can Ukraine abandon this implementation? She certainly can. But here we turn to another thesis from the article of Russian "intellectuals" - regarding the impossibility for Kyiv to infinitely rely on unconditional support from the West.
Without any doubt, our Western partners, first of all, the participants of the Norman process, will strictly insist that Ukraine fulfills her political commitments. Indeed, it is already a matter of losing prestige by Western leaders who proclaimed full implementation of the Minsk Agreements and the unconditional fulfillment of all relevant commitments by the parties as the cornerstone of their Donbass settling policy. Europe has become so entangled in declaring its loyalty to the Minsk Agreements that it seems that in principle, they can already see nothing, besides them and outside them, in particular, even the prospects of lasting peace. This behaviour, in fact, is not so new. The West has traditionally favoured formal "closure" of the problem (i.e., "frozen conflicts" at the post-Soviet space), rather than its actual and final solving. This is one of the causes of the decay of these conflicts over the decades. It is also necessary to take into account idolization of the elections themselves typical for the West, the tendency to consider them in isolation from other elements necessary for the functioning of full-fledged democracy in a society, without which the election process itself turns into a dummy. The consequence of such one-sidedness will be the insistence on the early elections at the de-occupied territories, which is absurd from many points of view, including the need to comply with the OSCE criteria, but it will be consistent with the letter of the Minsk Agreements.
In the context of all these factors, the direct refusal of Ukraine to implement the political part of the Minsk Agreements, in particular, promptly holding elections to local self-government bodies, can sharply worsen its relations with the leading countries of the West, first of all, Germany.
The probability of such deterioration, no matter how deep and prolonged it is, is another, second, threat to the national security of Ukraine associated with the peacekeeping operation.
Moreover, both of the above-identified threats in their complex create a kind of a "plug" for Ukraine, the status of chess zugzwang, when any move of a player leads to the deterioration of his position. It does not matter whether Ukraine will implement the Minsk Agreements, or will refuse from them. Each of these steps entails negative consequences for the country's security. The question as to which out of these two is greater evil is left out as it is not relevant to the objectives of this article.
However, the significant threats to Ukraine's security, which the peacekeeping operation bears, are not confined to it. There are things that Russia is ashamed to speak aloud, mere "nice nelly" . Therefore, they are not mentioned in the cited publication of "intellectuals", although, of course, they are taken into account. It reads about international sanctions connected with the aggression against Ukraine, the withdrawal of which is becoming increasingly important for the Russian Federation.
As it is known, the most serious among the imposed sanctions of the EU against Russia connected with its aggression against Ukraine concern the occupation of the Donbass. At the same time, their term is tied precisely to the implementation of the Minsk Agreements. The implementation of the latter would result in lifting these sanctions, as it has been stated on numerous occasions. Also, let us take into consideration that the representatives of the EU countries constantly speak of the expediency of encouraging Russia to implement the Minsk Agreements by gradual weakening of sanctions, syncronously with the progress in their implementation. I would like to remind you, for instance, that on 10 January, 2007 German Foreign Minister Z. Gabriel publicly declared at an event of the Eastern Committee of the German Economy (a collective body of several major federations of German business associations) that it would be right to cancel sanctions partially in the event that agreement with Russia on the format of the United Nations peacekeeping mission and a stable truce would be reached under the auspices of "blue helmets" in the Donbass. And there are still Austria, Greece, Italy, Hungary, their businessmen and politicians...
Accordingly, it is to be expected that with the onset of a peacekeeping operation in the Donbass, the pro-Russian European lobby of varying degrees will receive additional arguments for the deployment of a powerful campaign for at least a phased abolition of sanctions. And it has a great chance to succeed. The return to relations with Russia under the formula "business as usual" corresponds to the short-term interests of the European philistine who has nothing to do with the war in Ukraine. In this regard, we should also note that one of the reasons for strengthening the campaign for the abolition of sanctions can be a firm position of Ukraine as for the inappropriateness and harmfulness of the implementation of the political part of the Minsk Agreements while implementing their security part.
Will the weakening of the sanction regime against Russia have negative aftereffect for Ukraine? Without any doubt, and besides, rather considerable and multifacetal.
First and foremost, such a step should be considered as an indulgence for Russia, forgiveness of committed crimes against humanity, war, tears, thousands of casualties, crippled human lives. Impunity, as you know, encourages a perpetrator to repeat the crime. The appeasement of the Russian aggressor at the expense of the victim of aggression will be an incentive for Russia to continue the policy of destroying Ukraine, but in more sophisticated, and therefore even more dangerous forms. Russia will have time and opportunity for respite, accumulation of financial, material and human resources, modernization of the economy, military-industrial complex, and armed forces. Provided the policy as for Ukraine does not change, we shall soon oppose the same enemy, but strengthened and trained. Russia will not leave us alone. It needs to be understood absolutely clearly.
In addition, there is a threat of a situation in which the sanctions are canceled, but Russia will not be out of Donbass for good and all. It has left Syria not less than 3 times. Western businessmen and politicians can afford to pretend to be naive and pretend that they believe in everything that Russia will promise in the framework of the deployment of a peacekeeping operation, as was the case with the supply of Simens turbines to the Crimea. Ukraine does not have the right to such idiocy, because it will again have to pay our blood, the welfare of our children and grandchildren, and not Western partners.
Thus, the third threat to the security of Ukraine related to the peacekeeping operation is the high probability of the simultaneous withdrawal of economic sanctions from Russia.
However, this is not all. In my opinion, the above-mentioned triangle of interconnected threats, although it is most significant, but it does not completely cover the range of risks that a peacekeeping operation causes for Ukraine. This includes, for instance, possible inclusion of Russian personnel to the peacekeeping contingent. And it means that the latter can get already legal registration in the Donbass and continue their hostile activities on legal grounds. It is much more probable and not less harmful for Ukraine if Russia's CSTO allies would participate in the peacekeeping operation (their involvement, instead of the Russian contingent, is also mentioned in the above-mentioned publication of "intellectuals"). Does anyone doubt that the representatives of these satellite states of Moscow, above all, will work for the interests of the Russian Federation? And how many will be FSB guys among them or persons who just "accidentally" literally changed the Russian citizenship to Belarussian, Armenian, Kazakh, etc., and now they serve a new homeland as part of the peacekeeping contingent? Indeed, why not to change tacitly the citizenship of hundred or two persons for fraternal Russia?
I think that a certain threat is a favourable precondition created by a peacekeeping operation for the investment of the billions promised by the West for the reconstruction of the Donbas. These are substantial funds. The Ukrainian authorities can resort to hasty and reckless moves in chasing them.
Let us not forget that holding a peacekeeping operation in the Donbass will shift the question of returning the Crimea not to the second, but to the tenth place. It can disappear altogether from the agenda of the international community, which says something like: "First, a successful peacekeeping operation in the Donbass, and then we may think about the Crimea".
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Thus, as we may see, not everything is so simple and unambiguous with a peacekeeping operation at the Donbass. It is really linked with a wide range of security challenges for Ukraine, some of which are quite serious and sensitive. Working out preventive measures aimed at neutralizing and minimizing possible harm for Ukraine from the identified above and possible other threats of this kind requires a special, careful analysis, and its results should be discussed separately. So let us work on it!
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* Information about the author:
Amb. Olexander Samarskiy, CRS, Deputy CEO
[1] The article had been written before the last round of those talks, which took place on 26 January, this year, and, accordingly, had not taken into account their results. However, the latter, as it can be seen, only confirm the main conclusions of the analysis which has already been made.
[2] I take the word “intellectuals” in quotation marks, since the mouthpieces and supporters of the Nazi ideology of the Russian World, which is the ideological basis of Russian politics, in particular, concerning Ukraine, are not, in principle, the elite of a civilized society despite professional training. Nazi is everywhere and always the Nazi. And an intellectual servant of Nazism is perhaps the lowest level of moral degradation of an individual.